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1 Introduction 
 
The social (i.e. technological progress, growth) and private (i.e. competitive advantages) 
incentives to invest in R&D have been known for some time (Aghion et al. 2005; Jones and 
Williams 1998; Solow 1957; Zachariadis 2004). In spite of this insight, financing constraints 
remain one of the major factors leading to an underinvestment in R&D (European 
Commission 2010a; European Commission 2010b; Eurostat 2008; Hall and Lerner 2010). 
This is mainly rooted in the special characteristics of this kind of expenditure, including 
significant uncertainties, huge sunk costs, low collateral and a high proportion of expenditure 
for personnel (Hall 2002; Hall and Lerner 2010). Moreover, capital market imperfections due 
to adverse selection and moral hazard make R&D financing by external sources difficult (Hall 
2002; Hall and Lerner 2010). These theoretical considerations of the impact of financing 
constraints on R&D are widely discussed (e.g. Hall 2002; Hall and Lerner 2010). 
Although financing constraints for R&D have also been investigated empirically for some 
time (e.g. Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2010; Hall et al. 2016; He and Tian 2018), it remains 
questionable whether R&D reacts sensitively to the supply of external financing in general 
and bank financing in particular (e.g. Hall 2002; Brown et al. 2012; Kerr and Nanda 2015). 
This is said to be rooted in the characteristics of R&D projects which make their financing 
unattractive for debt holders like banks (Hall 2002). Accordingly, it is assumed that R&D is 
largely financed by internal means (e.g. Bougheas et al. 2003; Knudsen and Lien 2014). 
However, studies find that there is an impact of bank characteristics (frequently measured as 
averages on the regional level) on R&D or its inputs (e.g. Benfratello et al. 2008; Hsu et al. 
2014; Nanda and Nicholas 2014). Thus, the question of the relevance of bank financing for 
R&D remains under debate (e.g. Hall 2002; He and Tian 2018; Kerr and Nanda 2015). The 
aim of this paper is to contribute to this discussion by providing first evidence of how the 
relevance and intensity of the individual constraints of a firm to finance R&D differ as a 
function of the general financial market situation and the specific situation of their main bank. 
For this purpose, the paper analyzes two main research questions. First, what effect do 
fundamental changes to the situation on the financial market have on the firms’ financial 
restrictions (in terms of relevance and intensity)? Second, to what extent does this effect 
depend on the constraints of their main bank as supplier of external finance? 
To answer these questions, we utilize the firms’ credit rating as a measure for financing 
constraints. Additionally, we consider the financial crisis (2008–2009) and the simultaneous 
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introduction of the Basel II accord (2007) as periods in which the degree of financing 
constraints for R&D intensifies. The reason for this lies in the fact that the enactment of the 
Basel II accord in 2007 was accompanied by stronger regulations concerning bank capital 
requirements, credit risk assessment by banks and a stronger emphasis on the borrower’s 
credit rating (e.g. Scellato and Ughetto 2010; Schindele and Szczesny 2016).1 Additionally, 
the financial crisis of 2008/2009 marks a period of increased information asymmetries 
between borrower and lender (e.g. Gilchrist and Mojon 2018), stronger collateral 
requirements (e.g. Gilchrist and Mojon 2018) and credit supply reductions (e.g. Puri et al. 
2011). Thus, both events affected banks and lead us to expect that financially constrained 
firms (i.e. firms with worse credit ratings) would face even more serious problems in 
financing their R&D expenditure between 2007 and 2009 compared to the prior period.2 By 
additionally utilizing a post-crisis period (2010–2012), we have the opportunity to test 
whether the firm’s sensitivity of R&D to financing constraints returns to its pre-crisis level.3 
In a second step, we provide first evidence of whether the sensitivity (in terms of strength and 
duration) of R&D to financing constraints during the financial crisis is conditional on the 
firm’s main bank balance sheet strength. Bank capital serves as an indicator for bank balance 
sheet strength and plays a particularly important role in the resilience of banks to adverse 
shocks and their impact on the real economy e.g. via bank lending (Diamond and Rajan 2000; 
Holmstrom and Tirole 1997; Jiménez et al. 2012; Kapan and Minoiu 2018). In that respect, it 
is empirically shown that banks with higher bank capital realize larger loan growth rates (e.g. 
Kapan and Minoiu 2018; Gambacorta and Shin 2018) and are subject to a lower probability of 
default (e.g. Berger and Bouwman 2013) in the recent financial crisis. Moreover, bank capital 
requirements play an important role in the Basel II accord to improve the banks’ risk 
management (Schindele and Szczesny 2016). Consequently, it is to be expected that the effect 
of financial constraints for R&D in the period between 2007 and 2009 depends on the degree 
of capitalization of the firm’s main bank. 
Our data basis is the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), i.e. the German part of the 
Community Innovation survey (CIS), for the years 2002 to 2012. We combine the MIP with 
1 See Schindele and Szczesny (2016) as well as Scellato and Ughetto (2010) for a detailed description of the 
Basel II guidelines. 
2 See e.g. Lee et al. (2015) who show that financing problems of firms became more severe in the recent 
financial crisis. Also Kulicke et al. (2010) and Rammer (2011) show that R&D of German companies decreased 
in the recent financial crisis. 
3 See e.g. Giebel and Kraft (2019) as well as Hud and Hussinger (2015) who also consider 2010 as a post-crisis 
year in the context of R&D financing. Our approach, however, extends this post-crisis time-period even further. 
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two additional data sets. First, we add a credit rating index calculated by Creditreform, the 
leading firm rating agency in Germany. Second, having information on the firm’s main bank 
identifier allows us to merge the MIP with bank balance sheet information from Bankscope, 
compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Having access to this rich data set allows us to test whether 
firms react more sensitively to financing constraints in the financial crisis by applying a 
difference-in-differences estimation approach. For this objective, we utilize the firm’s credit 
rating as a continuous treatment indicator which measures the firm’s degree of financing 
constraints (i.e. the situation of internal financing and access to external financing).4 This 
allows us to test whether there is a change in impact of the extent of a firm’s financial 
constraints on R&D from the pre-crisis period (2002–2006) to the financial crisis (2008–
2009) and the simultaneous introduction of the Basel II accord (2007). Utilizing a post-crisis 
period (2010-2012) gives us the opportunity to test whether the effect persists in the period 
after the financial crisis or returns to its pre-crisis level. Taking advantage of the information 
on the firm’s main bank, we measure for its capitalization to classify the banks as low or high-
capitalized banks. This allows us to subsequently apply difference-in-differences regressions 
for firms related to high and low-capitalized banks. 
The difference-in-differences results with two treatment periods indicate that the sensitivity of 
R&D to financing constraints is stronger during the financial crisis than the period before. 
Thus, firms with higher constraints reduced their R&D spending more strongly than firms 
with lower constraints during the main crisis period. Making use of the bank’s capital 
endowment and applying difference-in-differences regressions for firms related to high and 
low-capitalized banks leads to the following results: The intensity of financing constraints for 
R&D in times of stress on financial markets and the enactment of the Basel II accord depends 
on the firm’s main bank characteristics. In other words, firms related to banks with less capital 
resources suffered particularly in the crisis period. Consequently, the greater impact of 
financing constraints on R&D during the crisis is driven by the financial crisis and only partly 
– if at all – by the implemented Basel II guidelines. Corporate customers of banks with better 
capitalization show no significantly different behavior with respect to R&D expenditures 
when the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods are compared to the crisis period. The validity 
of these results is underlined by various robustness tests (e.g. scaling the dependent variable, 
alternative modelling choices, changes to the rating variable, adjustments to the bank 
4 See e.g. Czarnitzki (2006), Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011a), Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011b), Czarnitzki 
and Kraft (2007) as well as Peters et al. (2017) for applications. 
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measures, changes to sample size and time period re-definitions). Moreover, accounting for a 
possible endogenous matching between firms and banks as well as sample selection does not 
alter the results considerably. 
The results of the study contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we extend the strand 
of literature investigating the effect of financial constraints (i.e. cash flow) on R&D (e.g. 
Harhoff 1998; Hall et al. 2016; Himmelberg and Petersen 1994) and literature that uses a 
credit rating index as indicator for financing constraints to explain R&D expenses (e.g. 
Czarnitzki 2006; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2011a; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2011b; Peters et 
al. 2017). We add to both strands of literature by investigating whether the effect of financial 
constraints on R&D is stronger in times of stress on financial markets or when banks 
scrutinize the credit worthiness of their borrowers more closely. In that respect, our study 
largely extends the above-mentioned literature by additionally considering potential changes 
in the supply of external financing. Thus, we add novel evidence to this strand of literature by 
investigating the heterogeneity of this effect when exploiting information on the supplier of 
external financing – the firm’s main bank. For this reason, we also contribute to and extend 
the strand of literature investigating the effect of financing constraints on R&D spending in 
dependence of restricted supply of external (equity) financing (e.g. Brown et al. 2009; Brown 
et al. 2012; Brown et al. 2013; Brown and Petersen 2009; Brown and Petersen 2011). This is 
mainly due to the fact that, in contrast to these studies, we concentrate on restricted bank 
financing and use the financial crisis as a period of stress on financial markets. 
Secondly, we extend work that utilizes bank characteristics to determine the effect of bank 
financing on firm innovation (Amore et al. 2013; Benfratello et al. 2008; Chava et al. 2013; 
Cornaggia et al. 2015; Hsu et al. 2014; Nanda and Nicholas 2014). We begin by addressing 
the effect of firm financing constraints in combination with bank financing constraints. Then, 
by applying firm-bank level data, we are able to draw a more detailed picture than the above-
mentioned studies, which use regional indicators to identify bank characteristics. Finally, we 
also add to those studies which use patents as identifiers for innovation activities (e.g. Amore 
et al. 2013; Chava et al. 2013; Cornaggia et al. 2015; Nanda and Nicholas 2014) by 
considering R&D expenditures. This allows us to overcome issues related to the use of patents 
as a dependent variable (He and Tian 2018). Moreover, using R&D opens up the possibility to 
determine the direct effects of a negative shock to banks on innovation inputs. 
Thirdly, we complement and extend studies which investigate the impact of firm financing on 
R&D in the recent financial crisis (e.g. Hud and Hussinger 2015). In that context we also add 
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to studies which investigate the impact of firm characteristics on innovation during the crisis 
(e.g. Archibugi et al. 2013a; Archibugi et al. 2013b; Campello et al. 2010; Filippetti and 
Archibugi 2011; Paunov 2012). We do so by considering financial constraints of firms and 
bank characteristics to identify constraints from the supply side. Additionally, we extend these 
studies significantly by considering the changing impact of financing constraints over time. 
Moreover, utilizing a period after the financial crisis is informative since it otherwise remains 
unclear whether the original situation will return. This third period is not usually considered 
by other studies (e.g. Archibugi et al. 2013a; Archibugi et al. 2013b; Campello et al. 2010; 
Filippetti and Archibugi 2011; Paunov 2012) or is treated as a prolongation of the post-crisis 
period already used (e.g. Hud and Hussinger 2015). 
Fourthly, we contribute to the strand of literature that utilizes a matched firm-bank data set to 
determine the effects of changes in credit supply on German firms during the recent financial 
crisis (e.g. Dwenger et al. 2018, Giebel and Kraft 2019; Huber 2018). We extend Dwenger et 
al. (2018) and complement Giebel and Kraft (2019) as well as Huber (2018) by analyzing the 
impact of the changing conditions on financial markets and a restrictive supply of external 
financing on the sensitivity of R&D to firm financing constraints. In contrast to Giebel and 
Kraft (2019), as well as Huber (2018), we utilize a credit rating index as a measure for 
financing constraints and determine its changing impact over time. Unlike these two studies, 
we utilize bank capital to identify bank credit supply restrictions and their impact on R&D. 
Thus, especially in contrast to Huber (2018), we consider R&D expenses as innovation input 
while Huber (2018) uses patents as an innovation output measure. We also extend Giebel and 
Kraft (2019) by adding a period after the financial crisis to determine whether the impact of 
financing constraints remains enhanced or whether it declines to the pre-crisis level. Utilizing 
a matched firm-bank data set, we also extend studies which investigate the impact of banks’ 
capital resources on banking during the financial crisis (e.g. Beltratti and Stulz 2012; di Patti 
and Sette 2016; Gambacorta and Shin 2018; Kapan and Minoiu 2018; Košak et al. 2015) by 
adding evidence for the effects on the real economy, namely RaD expenditures of firms. 
Moreover, analyzing the effect of financing constraints on R&D by utilizing a credit rating 
index and bank capital indicators, we contribute to and extend studies which investigate the 
impact of the Basel II reform on firms (e.g. Schindele and Szczesny 2016; Scellato and 
Ughetto 2010). 
Our paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 focuses on financing constraints and the impact of 
distress in the financial system on firm financing and R&D. Data, variables and methodology 
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are explained in Section 3. The regression results are covered in Section 4. Section 5 covers 
the description and results of several robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 presents our 
concluding remarks. 
2 Financing constraints and R&D expenditures  
2.1 Theoretical framework 
In case of a perfect capital market, obtaining the necessary amount of external funding to 
finance any type of investment might be no problem (Modigliani and Miller 1958). However, 
imperfections on capital markets exist that are rooted in agency conflicts and asymmetric 
information problems (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). These issues 
lead to higher costs for external funding and difficulties in switching between financing 
sources (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Thus, in imperfect capital 
markets, a difference in the costs between internal and external funds exists (Fazzari et al. 
1988). 
R&D investments are particularly subject to this type of problem as they are usually sunk, 
provide low collateral and are connected with uncertainties (Hall 2002). The latter point refers 
to the fact that the future success of the innovation process and the prospective market 
acceptance are not known to the firm (Hall 2002). Moreover, asymmetric information 
between borrower and lender prevail (Hall 2002). These are likewise severe, as the borrower 
might not want to provide a valuable signal about the value of the R&D project (Bhattacharya 
and Ritter 1983) although a patent could serve as a quality signal (Hottenrott et al. 2016; 
Hochberg et al. 2018). 
The relation between R&D expenditures and cost of capital is shown in Figure 1.5 As 
increasing costs of capital make R&D expenses less attractive, the demand for R&D 
investment is depicted by the downward sloping marginal rate of return curve 𝐷𝐷. Its location 
is determined by the future profits of the R&D investment. The marginal cost of capital curve 
depicts the supply of capital and consists of two parts. The horizontal part represents the 
constant marginal costs of capital for internal funds. The amount of available internal means 
is denoted by (𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼) and external capital costs are depicted by the steeper part of the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀-
curve. The upward slope results from the increased costs of capital for this type of funds as, 
argued earlier. Due to the characteristics of innovation highlighted above, it is argued that this 
5 The graphic representation follows works like David et al. (2000); Hall (2002); Hottenrott and Peters (2012); 
Knudsen and Lien (2014). 
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type of investment is largely financed by internal means (e.g. Carpenter and Petersen 2002; 
Hall and Lerner 2010; Fazzari et al. 1988; Ughetto 2008). Thus, we assume that the 
intersection between the demand and costs of capital curves lies in the horizontal area of 
internal financing. This intersection point marks the optimal amount of R&D investment (𝑅𝑅∗) 
for the firm. 
Figure 1 also depicts the change in investment levels when a negative shock to internal 
financing occurs while external financing costs remain the same. The new costs of capital 
curve 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀′ consists of a shorter horizontal part, ending at the point with the maximum 
available internal financing 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼′. The firm experiencing a negative shock to internal financing 
realizes investment amount 𝑅𝑅′ which is lower than the optimal amount of investment 𝑅𝑅∗. 
Consequently, the contraction of internal financing from 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 to 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼′ leads to an investment 
reduction from 𝑅𝑅∗ to 𝑅𝑅′.6 Empirical studies on financing constraints show that lower internal 
means are indeed associated with lower R&D spending (e.g. Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2011a; 
Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2011b; Hall 1992; Harhoff 1998; Himmelberg and Petersen 1994; 
Peters et al. 2017). 
Figure 1: The optimal R&D investment with and without internal financing 
constraints 
 
Notes: The figure shows the relationship between demand for financials resources to cover R&D expenditures 
6 Alternatively, we could think about a continuum of firms with the same demand curve and the same difference 
between internal and external costs of financing. However, the firms differ with respect to internal means 
available such that the range of internal financing lies between 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼′ and 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼. The resulting R&D expenditures would 
range from 𝑅𝑅′ to 𝑅𝑅∗. 
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and the supply of capital. Demand is reflected by the marginal rate of return curve (𝐷𝐷) while supply is 
indicated by the marginal cost of capital curve (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀). The available internal financing is denoted by 𝐹𝐹 and 
lies at the end of the constant part of the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 curve. The intersection between supply and demand determines 
𝑅𝑅, which is the amount of investment made. 
Enhanced costs for external funding, for example due to a shock on financial markets, led to 
an inward shift of the upward sloping part of the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 curve. This situation, assuming a shift 
in this part of the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 curves for all firms, is depicted in Figure 2. A reduction in external 
financing is not binding if enough internal finance is available. This situation is illustrated by 
the rotation of the upward sloping part of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 to 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀′′.7 However, if the firm faces a 
negative shock to internal financing and has higher external capital costs (i.e. due to a 
negative shock), the new cost of capital curve is denoted by 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀′′′. The resulting optimal 
investment under these conditions is 𝑅𝑅′′′. This point is further reduced than in the absence of 
a reduced supply of external finance, when 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀′ would be relevant and 𝑅𝑅′ would be realized. 
Accordingly, 𝑅𝑅′′′ is also below the initial, optimal investment volume (𝑅𝑅∗). Thus, besides the 
availability of internal means, access to external finance plays a crucial role with respect to 
R&D financing (Hall 2002; Hall and Lerner 2010). Within the financial constraints literature, 
studies indeed find a higher R&D-to-cashflow sensitivity when controlling for the use of 
external finance by equity (e.g. Brown et al. 2012). 
Figure 2: The optimal R&D investment under internal and external financing 
constraints 
 
7 The underlying assumption is that the firm does not reallocate capital away from investment R if the external 
capital costs increase to finance any other investment. 
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Notes: The figure shows the relationship between demand for financial resources to cover R&D expenditures 
and the supply of capital if external financing constraints are taken into account. Demand is reflected by the 
marginal rate of return curve (𝐷𝐷) while supply is indicated by the marginal cost of capital curve (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀). The 
available internal financing is denoted by 𝐹𝐹 and lies at the end of the constant part of the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 curve. The 
intersection between supply and demand determines 𝑅𝑅, which is the amount of investment made. 
2.2 The impact of external financing supply in the recent financial crisis 
Especially in bank-based systems like Germany, banks are the main supplier of external 
finance (Audretsch and Elston 1997; Edwards and Fischer 1996; Elsas and Krahnen 1998; De 
Massis et al. 2018) and firm financing depends largely on bank loan supply (e.g. Agarwal and 
Elston 2001; Berger and Udell 1995; Chava and Purnanandam 2011; Kahle and Stulz 2013). 
It is shown that financially distressed firms face problems in accessing external financing in 
normal times (e.g. Harhoff and Körting 1998). Thus, a negative bank shock might affect firm 
financing in the form of higher borrowing costs and lower credit supply (e.g. Upper and 
Worms 2004). This also holds for the recent financial crisis, a period in which firms faced 
increased costs for – and reduced supply of – external financing in terms of bank credit (e.g. 
Bundesbank 2009; Holton et al. 2014; Kapan and Minoiu 2018; Puri et al. 2011).8 
Consequently, firms with higher financing constraints face larger problems during the 
financial crisis and reduce their R&D spending to a greater extent than firms with lower 
financing constraints. 
During the crisis the banks individually experienced varying degrees of problems due to the 
different amounts of equity or other reserves that strengthened their capital base (Adrian et al. 
2018; Beltratti and Stulz 2012; Berger and Bouwman 2013; Jiménez et al. 2012; Kapan and 
Minoiu 2018). Bank capital reflects a bank’s own funds (Adrian et al. 2018), determines its 
ability to absorb losses (Diamond and Rajan 2000; Kapan and Minoiu 2018; Mingo 1975), 
serves as proxy for the agency costs of borrowing (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997; Jiménez et al. 
2012) and determines the costs of funding i.e. lending on the interbank market (Adrian et al. 
2018; Gambacorta and Shin 2018; Kapan and Minoiu 2018; Mingo 1975). Thus, higher bank 
8 In an economic downturn like the recent financial crisis, consumer demand falls (OECD 2009; Storm and 
Naastepad 2015). The decrease in demand likely affects R&D expenditures of firms negatively due to a 
reduction in internal means (Knudsen and Lien 2014). It is argued that a reduction in demand might have 
ambiguous effects on R&D expenditures of firms (Knudsen and Lien 2014). The resulting reduction in output 
decreases the opportunity costs of reallocating resources from manufacturing to R&D. Due to this opportunity 
cost effect, firms would rather invest counter-cyclically in R&D (Aghion and Saint-Paul 1998; Barlevy 2007). 
On the other hand, it is also argued that the decrease in demand might lead to reduced R&D spending, due to 
lower investment incentives (Schmookler 1966; Shleifer 1986). Thus, it is questionable whether the opportunity 
cost effect exerts any impact on R&D expenses. Following the argumentation of Knudsen and Lien (2014) the 
R&D-enhancing opportunity cost effect only predominates when the fall in demand is small. When the fall in 
demand is large enough, internal means decrease and the need for funding from external sources increases. In 
this case the opportunity cost effect is dominated by the consequences resulting from reductions in internal 
means and credit supply (Aghion et al. 2012; Knudsen and Lien 2014; López-Garcia et al. 2013). 
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capital is associated with higher bank lending in general (e.g. Berrospide and Edge 2010; 
Buch and Prieto 2014). Additionally, bank capital matters for the transmission of financial 
shocks to lending (Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2004; Peek and Rosengren 1997).9 This is also 
observed in the recent financial crisis, as studies (e.g. Beltratti and Stulz 2012; di Patti and 
Sette 2016; Gambacorta and Shin 2018; Kapan and Minoiu 2018; Košak 2015) show that the 
contraction of lending by banks indeed depended on bank capitalization. Moreover, the 
enactment of the Basel II accord in 2007 was connected with minimum capital requirements 
for banks (e.g. Schindele and Szczesny 2016). These were intended to induce banks to make 
provisions for risks (e.g. Schindele and Szczesny 2016). Consequently, we expect that firms 
with higher financing constraints which are associated with a poorly capitalized bank would 
reduce their R&D expenditures to a greater extent than firms with lower financing constraints 
during the financial crisis. For firms associated with a more strongly capitalized bank, we 
assume that the sensitivity of R&D to financing constraints would not change remarkably 
during the crisis. 
3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Data and Variables 
We use data for the years 2002 to 2012 from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP). The MIP 
is the German part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS).10 It comprises data for firm-
specific information concerning R&D-like innovation and R&D expenses on a yearly basis. 
Each firm in our sample is accompanied by bank account information. Consequently, we are 
able to combine the basis MIP data with bank balance sheet data from Bankscope which is 
compiled by Bureau van Dijk. By combining both data sets we are able to construct a yearly 
data set with repeated cross sections, since not all firms answer the questionnaire regularly.  
The firms in our sample stem from the high-tech and low-tech manufacturing sectors as well 
as knowledge-intensive services. These are roughly all industries sampled in the MIP and 
comprise the NACE Rev 2.0 codes from 5 to 39 and 58 to 66 as well as 69 to 73. Our final 
sample consists of 8,739 firm-years for 3,252 firms. 
To test for the impact of financing constraints on R&D, we utilize the R&D expenditures of 
firms, as commonly applied in the literature (e.g. Brown et al. 2012; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 
2011b). To improve the distribution properties of the dependent variable, we use the 
9 See e.g. Kleff and Weber (2008) as well as Memmel and Raupach (2010) for analysis concerning bank capital 
in Germany. 
10 See Aschhoff et al. (2013) for more methodological details of the MIP for the survey waves 2006 to 2010.  
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logarithm of R&D expenses. Since some firms possibly perform no R&D and have no related 
expenses, we observe zero values. Simply applying the logarithm would lead to the drop of 
these zero value observations, which would result in a serious bias in our results. Thus, we 
apply the transformation ln(R&D+1).11  
As an identifier of firms’ financing constraints, we apply the firm’s individual credit rating 
‘Rating’ in accordance with the suggestion of Carreira and Silva (2010). The utilized rating 
index is calculated by the largest German credit rating agency, Creditreform. It is constructed 
utilizing several qualitative and quantitative factors and ranges from 100 (best rating) to 600 
(worst rating). The construction of the rating index allows a characterization of the financial 
situation of a firm.12 In that respect, Czarnitzki (2006), Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011a), 
Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011b) used the credit rating as a measure for access to external 
capital and for the internal financing situation of the firm13, and Peters et al. (2017) applied it 
as indicator for the financial strength of a firm.14 Our sample does not include firms with pre-
crisis rating values larger or equal to 500 as these firms are close to bankruptcy. 
Additionally, we use variables for firm characteristics that are common to the literature: 
Lagged employees in thousands ‘Size’ and its square ‘Size squared’ as well as firm age in 
years ‘Age’ and its square ‘Age squared’. ‘Group membership’ is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the unit belongs to a firm group (unit value) or not (zero). Additionally, we 
use the lagged share of exports divided by sales ‘Export share’ to control for demand-related 
influences on the R&D expenditures.15 Moreover, we utilize the lagged value of sales growth 
‘Sales growth’ as an additional indicator for the financial situation of the firm. 
Next, we use our bank balance sheet information from the Bankscope database to apply 
several measures as proxy for the bank’s financial strength in terms of capital. For reasons of 
exogeneity, all variables are measured as of 2006 such that they are determined prior to the 
crisis16 and before the Basel II guidelines became binding. One variable used is the ratio of 
11 Similar results are achieved if we apply the logarithm according to Cameron and Trivedi (2010) and use γ, a 
slightly smaller value than the minimum value as censoring point. 
12 The index is built from several items of firm information like liquidity, balance sheet structure, financing, 
legal form, ownership structure, industry, prior credit requests, ability to repay credits in time. See e.g. 
Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011a) for a detailed description of the construction of the rating index. We include 
federal state fixed effects to control for the possible regional variation in the index. 
13 Czarnitzki and Kraft (2007) show that a weaker firm rating is indeed correlated with higher interest rate 
payments. 
14 Moreover, we use the lagged rating value to verify the robustness of our results. 
15 See e.g. Bricongne et al. (2012) and Eaton et al. (2016) who show that the fall in demand during the financial 
crisis is correlated with exporting activity. 
16 See e.g. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) for a similar handling of variables. 
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equity to total assets, which corresponds to the inverse leverage ratio (Adrian et al. 2018; 
Berger and Bouwman 2013; Jiménez et al. 2012). However, we follow the literature (e.g. 
Anginer et al. 2016; Bayazitova and Shivdasani 2012; Bitar et al. 2018; Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
2013; Kapan and Minoiu 2018, Tran et al. 2016) and take into account the quality of capital 
by using tangible common equity, which does not include intangible assets, goodwill and 
preferred stock (Bayazitova and Shivdasani 2012; Kapan and Minoiu 2018). Thus, we utilize 
the ratio of tangible common equity over tangible assets to create the variable ‘Tangible 
common equity’.17 A higher ratio implies a higher share of high-quality capital and therefore 
a better ability to absorb losses and to withstand shocks (Kapan and Minoiu 2018). 
Furthermore, investors prefer this ratio over regulatory ratios like the Tier 1 ratio (Kapan and 
Minoiu 2018). 
We then apply the ‘Capital funds’ measure which is determined by the ratio of capital funds 
to total assets (Avdjiev et al. 2019; Nguyen 2012). Capital funds include equity, hybrid capital 
and subordinated debts (Avdjiev et al. 2019). Both subordinated debt and hybrid capital 
belong to Tier 2 capital (e.g. Brinkmann and Horvitz 1995; Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2013; Ito 
and Sasaki 2002; Llorens and Martin-Oliver 2017; Montgomery 2005) and have the ability to 
absorb losses (e.g. Llorens and Martin-Oliver 2017). Moreover, subordinated debt could be 
issued to increase the capital adequacy of banks (Ito and Sasaki 2002; Montgomery 2005). 
Thus, the ratio of capital funds to total assets is also used to proxy for the capital adequacy of 
banks (Avdjiev et al. 2019; Nguyen 2012). In additional robustness tests, we consider two 
further measures: first, the inverse of leverage calculated as equity over total assets ‘Equity 
over total assets’; then, we employ the ratio of capital funds over net loans ‘Capital funds over 
net loans’. 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.18 In about 25 percent of cases R&D expenses are 
equal to zero. Firm size is 344 employees on average, which is above the threshold normally 
assumed for a small and medium size enterprise of 250 employees. Nevertheless, more than 
75% percent of the firms in our sample are SMEs. The average age of firms is about 31 years. 
The average credit rating is about 217 in our sample, which corresponds to a good rating 
according to the Creditreform index. The tangible common equity ratio amounts to a mean of 
about 4 percent. The size of capital funds is on average about 6% of bank assets. 
17 The ratio of tangible common equity over risk weight assets is a commonly applied ratio in the context of the 
Basel III requirements on bank capital (e.g. Yan et al. 2012). 
18 See Table A1 and A2 in Appendix A for the distribution of firms over industries and federal states. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 8739 firm-years 
 
 Mean SD P10 P25 Median P75 P90 
Firm variables        
Log of R&D 9.676 5.816 0 7.579 11.961 13.570 17.952 
Size 0.344 2.050 0.004 0.021 0.058 0.178 4.043 
Age 30.67 31.323 3 12 18 35 146 
Group membership 0.493 0.500 0 0 0 1 1 
Sales growth 0.064 0.258 −0.540 −0.053 0.044 0.150 1 
Export share 0.242 0.264 0 0.003 0.140 0.423 0.922 
Rating index as of 2006 216.756 41.552 116 193 215 243 314 
Lagged rating index 215.121 42.594 115 192 213 237 325 
Bank variables        
Tangible common equity 4.005 2.137 1.710 2.800 4.060 5.300 9.190 
Capital funds 5.768 2.303 2.700 5.150 5.380 7.140 13.710 
Equity over total assets 4.088 2.102 1.750 2.920 4.150 5.310 9.190 
Capital funds over net loans 13.341 9.843 6.890 8.180 11.660 15.950 41.410 
Note: The count for the Subsidy variable is 6148 as this information was not available in each survey year. 
 
3.2 Identification of the effect of financing constraints on R&D 
First, we want to investigate the sensitivity of R&D to financing constraints in a period of 
stress on financial markets (financial crisis) compared to times when market conditions are 
more stable. For this purpose, we analyze specific time periods before (2002-2006), during 
(2007-2009) and after (2010-2012) the financial crisis and perform tests applying difference-
in-differences estimations. Accordingly, we establish a causal relationship between the 
change in R&D expenditures due to the crisis and financing constraints. The intention is to 
test whether firms with a high financial strength change their R&D expenditures during the 
crisis to a lesser extent than firms with a lower financial strength. 
To perform our analysis, we use the rating measure described above as of 2006 as continuous 
treatment indicator.19 Additionally, we construct several indicator variables that represent 
specific time periods during and after the crisis. The constructed dummy ‘Crisis’ covers the 
time period of considerable tensions on financial markets and therefore takes the value one for 
the years 2007 to 2009 and otherwise zero.20 The dummy variable ‘PostCrisis’ comprises the 
time after the severe distress on financial markets and takes value one for the years 2010 to 
19 We take the measure as of 2006 such that our indicator is not affected by the financial crisis in 2008/2009 or 
the implementation of the Basel II guidelines in 2007. Another reason for fixing the measure in 2006 is that the 
Basel II guidelines took effect in 2007. These guidelines promote a stronger focus on credit risk. The borrower 
risk is evaluated either with an internal rating-based approach or an external credit rating. 
20 First effects of the financial crisis for the banking sector were evident in Germany in the third quarter of 2007 
(e.g. Dietrich and Vollmer 2012; Puri et al. 2011). Additionally, Basel II took effect in 2007 and affected firms 
(credit rating) and banks (capital requirements). Robustness tests concerning the definition of the time periods 
are shown in Section 5.5.  
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2012 and zero for the period before (2002-2009). Accordingly, we apply the following 
specification with multiple treatment periods, based on Imbens and Wooldridge (2009): ln(R&D)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Rating𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2Rating𝑖𝑖 × Crisis𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3Rating𝑖𝑖 × PostCrisis𝑖𝑖 (1) 
 +𝛽𝛽X′ + 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
Interacting ‘Crisis’ and ‘PostCrisis’ with the rating measure yields the change in R&D 
expenses conditional on the degree of financing constraints in the respective period compared 
to the period before 2007. The vector 𝑋𝑋′ consists of additional control variables described 
above. In addition, we apply industry (φ), federal state (η) and year fixed effects (γ) in each 
regression. 
As a relevant fraction of the dependent variable has zero values, we account for possible 
corner solutions by applying a Tobit model (Wooldridge 2010). Wald tests concerning the 
homoscedasticity assumption of the Tobit model led to a rejection of the homoscedasticity 
assumption. To cope with this problem, we use the heteroscedastic Tobit according to Greene 
(2003). As a result, the normal variance component 𝜎𝜎 is replaced by a functional form  
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 =  𝜎𝜎 × 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑍𝑍′𝛼𝛼) which is obtained by inserting a set of size, age and industry dummies. 
Second, our analysis sheds light on the question of how the supply side of external financing 
affects the impact of financing constraints in the financial crisis. Thus, we assume that the 
firm’s sensitivity to financing constraints during and after the financial crisis depends on its 
main bank, as this is usually the most important source of external finance. We determine the 
level to which the bank is affected by the financial crisis if the capital endowment of the bank 
is in the lower quartile of the bank distribution of all German banks observed in the 
Bankscope database for the related bank variable.21 This implies a ratio of tangible common 
equity of below 5.17 percent and a ratio of capital funds to total assets of below 5.97 percent. 
Thus, in a second step, we estimate Equation (1) separately for firms related to low and high 
capitalized banks. 
4 Results 
4.1 Sensitivity of R&D to financing constraints over time 
We first test for the sensitivity of R&D to firm financing constraints in the financial crisis. 
Thus, we assume a homogeneous effect of the bank credit supply shock in the recent financial 
21 This allows us to infer from the distribution of all banks (1452) for which information is available from the 
Bankscope data set. Our sample covers 659 of these banks. The distribution of values for both bank capital 
measures are shown in Appendix A, Figures A1 and A2. 
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crisis on all firms. Results of the estimations of Equation (1) are shown in Table 2. Column 
(1) shows the results with discarded interaction terms. The coefficient of the rating variable is 
negative and highly significant at the one percent level. This indicates that firms with higher 
financing constraints (a poor rating value) invest less in R&D than their peers with greater 
financial strength. 
Next, we analyze whether the sensitivity of R&D to the rating variable changes over time. We 
include a variable for the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis period interacted with the rating 
variable. It becomes evident that the rating exerts its highest influence in the crisis period 
from 2007 to 2009 (Column 2). This coincides with the idea that R&D expenditures react 
more sensitively to financing constraints in times of distress on financial markets. For the post 
crisis period, it is evident that the impact of constraints on R&D almost returns to the previous 
level (Column 2). With respect to the time-related differences of the impact of constraints, we 
find that the more highly constrained firms indeed invest less in R&D in times of financial 
crisis (Column 3). However, we do not find a significant difference between the post-crisis 
and pre-crisis period (Column 3). Thus, for the estimate in Column (6), we find that a rating 
one point weaker coincides with a reduction in R&D expenditures by about 0.9 percentage 
points compared to a firm with a rating value that is one point better. At the extensive margin 
the results show that a firm with a rating one point weaker is 0.03 percent less likely to report 
a non-zero value for R&D expenditures compared to a firm with a rating that is one point 
better (Column 9). 
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Table 2: Impact of firm financing constraints on R&D over time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Tobit Margin Tobit Margin Tobit Margin 
 Tobit Intensive Extensive Tobit Intensive Extensive Tobit Intensive Extensive 
Rating −0.016*** −0.012*** −0.000***    −0.011*** −0.008*** −0.0003*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.000)    (0.003) (0.003) (0.0001) 
Rating × PreCrisis    −0.011*** −0.008*** −0.000***    
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)    
Rating × Crisis    −0.024*** −0.018*** −0.001*** −0.013*** −0.009*** −0.0003*** 
    (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.0001) 
Rating × PostCrisis    −0.016*** −0.011*** −0.000*** −0.004 −0.003 −0.0001 
    (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.0001) 
Size 0.896*** 0.648*** 0.020*** 0.884*** 0.640*** 0.020*** 0.884*** 0.640*** 0.020*** 
 (0.112) (0.081) (0.003) (0.113) (0.081) (0.003) (0.113) (0.081) (0.003) 
Size squared −0.017*** −0.012*** −0.000*** −0.016*** −0.012*** −0.000*** −0.016*** −0.012*** −0.000*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) 
Age −0.033*** −0.024*** −0.001*** −0.034*** −0.024*** −0.001*** −0.034*** −0.024*** −0.001*** 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.000) (0.013) (0.009) (0.000) (0.013) (0.009) (0.000) 
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Group membership 0.887*** 0.642*** 0.020*** 0.895*** 0.648*** 0.020*** 0.895*** 0.648*** 0.020*** 
 (0.244) (0.177) (0.005) (0.243) (0.176) (0.005) (0.243) (0.176) (0.005) 
Sales growth 0.386 0.279 0.009 0.394 0.285 0.009 0.394 0.285 0.009 
 (0.269) (0.194) (0.006) (0.269) (0.194) (0.006) (0.269) (0.194) (0.006) 
Export share 0.047*** 0.034*** 0.001*** 0.047*** 0.034*** 0.001*** 0.047*** 0.034*** 0.001*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) 
Constant 7.660***   6.743***   6.743***   
 (1.346)   (1.398)   (1.398)   
𝐻𝐻0: Rating × yeart = 0 ∀ 𝑡𝑡 < 2007 
p-value        0.194   
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Federal state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -23891.657 -23886.761 -23886.761 
Left-censored observations 2159 2159 2159 
Uncensored observations 6580 6580 6580 
Observations 8739 8739 8739 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. Significance: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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We test for the common trend assumption of the difference-in-differences approach and 
analyze the effect of heterogeneity by using a specification similar to Equation (1), but replace 
the dummy variables indicating the crisis or post-crisis periods by a set of year dummies for 
the years 2003 to 2012. This test serves as a test for the common trend assumption (Mora and 
Reggio 2015; Mora and Reggio 2019). Applying this approach, we follow recent applications 
(e.g. Hangoma et al. 2018; Miller 2018; Rowley et al. 2017). The common trend assumption 
holds if the joint test indicates that the interaction terms prior to 2007 are equal to zero. This is 
indeed the case, as shown by the relevant p-values of the test statistics at the bottom of Table 
2, Column (7).22 Moreover, Figure 3 plots the interaction effects and 95% confidence 
intervals. It becomes evident that there are no significant differences in the effects in the years 
2003 to 2006 compared to the baseline period 2002. In the period of interest (2007 to 2009), a 
significant reduction in R&D occurs depending on the degree of financing constraints of firms 
in the years 2007 and 2009. 
 
Figure 3: Impact of firm financing constraints on R&D over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the Tobit regression coefficients for the Rating×year interactions to obtain the p-
values shown at the bottom of Table 2, Column (7). The reference year is 2002. Detailed regression results are 
shown in Table B1 in Appendix B. 
 
22 Detailed estimation results are shown in Table B1, Appendix B. 
                                                          
4.2 The effect of financing constraints dependent on the supply of external financing 
The next set of tests analyzes the sensitivity of R&D to firm financing constraints conditional 
on the capitalization of the firm’s main bank. Results of estimating Equation (1) separately for 
firms associated with banks with low or high capitalization are shown in Table 3. For firms 
which are related to a high capitalized bank, there is no difference in R&D spending during 
the financial crisis and the period observed immediately thereafter compared to the pre-crisis 
period. This follows as the statistical insignificant coefficients of the interaction terms (Rating 
× Crisis and Rating × PostCrisis) indicate that the effects in these time periods are not 
different from that of Rating. In contrast, firms which are related to a bank that has only a 
limited ability to absorb shocks due to a low ratio of tangible common equity to tangible 
assets likewise suffer in the financial crisis period (Column 1). Similar results are obtained for 
the capital funds ratio (Columns 3, 4).23 
23 Detailed estimation results are shown in Tables C1, C2 and C3 in Appendix C. 
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Table 3: Impact of firm financing constraints on R&D accounting for bank differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Low High 
Tobit Margin Tobit Margin 
 Intensive Extensive  Intensive Extensive 
Panel A: Tangible common equity 
Rating −0.011*** −0.008*** −0.0002*** −0.014** −0.009** −0.0003** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.0001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.0002) 
Rating×Crisis −0.015*** −0.011*** −0.0003*** −0.008 −0.006 −0.0002 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.0001) (0.008) (0.005) (0.0002) 
Rating×PostCrisis −0.004 −0.003 −0.0001 −0.008 −0.005 −0.0002 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.0001) (0.009) (0.006) (0.0002) 
Constant 6.769***   6.773***   
 (1.790)   (2.446)   
𝐻𝐻0: Rating × yeart = 0 ∀ 𝑡𝑡 < 2007 
𝑒𝑒-value 0.382   0.633   
Observations 6355 6355 6355 2384 2384 2384 
Panel B: Capital funds 
Rating −0.012*** −0.009*** −0.0002*** −0.010* −0.007* −0.0002* 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.0001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.0001) 
Rating×Crisis −0.017*** −0.013*** −0.0003*** −0.005 −0.004 −0.0001 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.0001) (0.007) (0.005) (0.0002) 
Rating×PostCrisis −0.002 −0.002 0.0000 −0.008 −0.005 −0.0002 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.0001) (0.007) (0.005) (0.0002) 
Constant 6.856***   6.123***   
 (1.843)   (2.181)   
𝐻𝐻0: Rating × yeart = 0 ∀ 𝑡𝑡 < 2007 
𝑒𝑒-value 0.541   0.228   
Observations 5215 5215 5215 3524 3524 3524 
Notes: All estimations include firm controls as described in Section 3.1. Moreover, industry, federal state and 
time fixed effects are included. Low indicates that the firm is related to a bank in the lower 25% of the variable’s 
distribution of all German banks in the Bankscope data set. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered at the firm level. Significance: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** 
significant at the 1% level. 
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Again, we test for the common trend assumption by estimating Equation (1) but replacing the 
interaction terms by Rating×year interaction variables for the periods 2003 to 2012. The tests 
shown in the bottom row of Table 3 indicate that the common trend assumption holds as we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no joint significance of the pre-2007 interaction 
terms. This result is reinforced by the coefficient plots shown in Figure 4. We observe no 
difference in the effect in the period before 2007. However, in the time period of interest 
(2007 to 2009), we observe that the effect is different from the baseline period for firms which 
are related to a low-capitalized bank in the years 2007 and 2009. This relation does not hold 
for firms associated with high-capitalized banks. 
Figure 4: Impact of financing constraints on R&D over time dependent on bank capital 
(a) Low bank capital (b) High bank capital 
 
Notes: The figure shows the Tobit regression coefficients for the Rating×year interactions estimated for firms 
related to a low or high capitalized bank to obtain the p-values shown at the bottom of Table 3, Panels A and B, 
Columns (1,4). The reference year is 2002. Detailed regression results are shown in Table C3 in Appendix C. 
Consequently, we observe heterogeneity in the effect of the financial crisis on 
constrained firms. It becomes evident that constraints exert an effect on both groups of 
firms in the pre-crisis period. However, the interaction term shows that the increase in 
intensity of constraints during the crisis is significantly higher for this group of firms than 
for the group of firms associated with a high-capitalized bank. The differences in the effects 
between both groups of firms point towards an intensification of financing constraints due 
to the financial crisis rather than to an impact of the Basel II guidelines. This relation is 
assumed to hold as the Basel II regulations are expected to affect the importance of the 
ratings independently of the capital reserves of the banks. 
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5 Robustness and sensitivity tests 
5.1 Endogenous firm-bank matching and sample selection 
A possible problem of our empirical specification is that the affiliation of banks and firms 
may not be random. On the one hand, banks differ in terms of their risk policies (e.g. 
regarding orientation towards capital accumulation).24 On the other hand, firms also pursue 
varying risk strategies, and an important factor here is the decision for or against R&D. A 
possible consequence of this would be the association of banks and companies with an 
affinity for risk (and vice versa), as risk-affine banks are prepared to finance risky projects. 
The possible endogenous matching process could affect the impact of the crisis on research-
intensive companies. Consequently, a selectivity problem might exist. 
To account for this selectivity problem, we use an inverse probability weighting (IPW) 
approach (e.g. Abadie and Cattaneo 2018; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). First, we estimate 
the probability of each firm to be related to a low or high-capitalized bank by accounting for 
the impact of the firm’s creditworthiness in each year. In the second step, we calculate the 
inverse probability weight from the obtained propensity score. Finally, we estimate Equation 
(1) and perform the regressions for firms related to high and low-capitalized banks separately 
and weight the observations by the generated weight. This has two advantages. Firstly, the re-
weighting is supposed to eliminate potential differences between both types of firms by 
equalizing the explanatory variables. Secondly, the IPW approach is helpful in reducing the 
selection bias which results from the sample splitting approach in Section 4.2 (e.g. 
Wooldridge 2002; Wooldridge 2007).25 The results for the Probit estimation, indicating 
whether firms are related to a high or low-capitalized bank, are shown in Appendix D, Table 
D1. The corresponding test on the difference in mean of the explanatory variables after re-
weighting is shown in Table D2 of Appendix D. It becomes evident that there are no 
differences in means of the explanatory variables after the weighting. Table D3 shows the 
estimation results for the re-weighted regressions. The results look fairly similar to the 
estimates in Tables 2, 3. 
 
 
24 See e.g. Schwert (2018), Calem and Rob (1999), Furlong and Keeley (1989). 
25 Applying Heckman selection models to correct for the sample selection does not alter the results considerably. 
This holds for sample selection model with a linear model in the second step as well as with a Tobit model to 
account for corner solutions in the second step. 
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5.2 Model and dependent variable 
We provide several robustness tests for our analysis. Results for these are shown in Appendix 
E. First, we provide general tests concerning the model dependence of our results. Thus, we 
re-estimate the results of Tables 2, 3 using homoscedastic Tobit and OLS. The results are 
comparable to the estimates in Tables 2, 3 as shown in Panels A and B of Table E1 in 
Appendix E. Moreover, we re-estimate our results using the logarithm of the share of R&D 
expenditures per employee (Table E1, Panel C, Appendix E). Again, we observe similar 
results (Appendix E, Table E1). Additionally, we perform tests concerning the variables 
included in the heteroscedasticity term. The results for these tests (e.g. adding the remainder 
control variables) are shown in Table E2, Panels B, C and D and are fairly similar to the 
baseline results in Tables 2, 3. 
5.3 Changes to the rating variable 
We also test for the robustness of specification of our proxy for firm financing constraints, the 
rating variable. For this purpose, we start by using the one period lagged rating value as it is 
common practice in the literature (e.g. Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2011a; Czarnitzki and 
Hottenrott 2011b) to determine whether firms are financially constrained. In line with this 
strand of literature, we assume that the lagged rating measure is exogenously determined. The 
advantage of this modified rating variable is its variation over time. The results shown in 
Panel A of Table F1 are comparable to the benchmark results presented in Table 2 and the 
results for the bank capital differentiation in Table 3. Next, we use the mean value of the 
firm’s ratings in the three years prior to the Basel II guidelines (2004 to 2006). Again, we 
observe similar results (Tables F1, Panel B, Appendix F). Last, we provide the results for an 
extended sample in which we re-add the firms which have rating values of 500 or above. As 
shown in Panel C of Table F1 in Appendix F, these results are comparable to the ones shown 
in Tables 2, 3. 
5.4 Changes concerning bank-related information 
In addition to the previous robustness checks, we provide tests for the heterogeneity of our 
results concerning the supplier of external financing – the main banks. In a first step, we apply 
two specifications with cut-off points at 10% and 50% of the distributions of all banks in the 
Bankscope data set that are observed in the year 2006. The results are shown in Table G1, 
Panel A and B in Appendix G and they are quite similar to the results presented in Table 3. A 
second test in this respect comprises the firm-bank relationship. Therefore, we drop firms 
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from our sample that switched their main bank in any year of the sample period. We use the 
remainder of 5765 observations and re-estimate our results. As shown in Panel C of Table G1 
in Appendix G, the results of both estimations are comparable to the results presented in 
Tables 2, 3. Last, we use additional definitions for the capitalization of banks. First, we apply 
the alternative measure of equity to total assets, which is the inverse of the bank leverage ratio 
as described above. Second, we use the value of capital funds to net loans (Avdjiev et al. 
2019). Results based on these variables and the cut-off point at 25% are shown in Table G2 of 
Appendix G. They are fairly similar to the estimates in Table 3. 
In a further set of tests concerning the definition of our bank variables, we exploit the full 
bank account information of the firms. We have access to up to six banks to which the firm is 
related. This allows us to re-define the indicator which sorts the firms into those which are 
related to a low or a high capitalized bank. Results of these tests are shown in Appendix G, 
Table G3, Panel A and B. First, we sort firms into the ʻLow’ group if at least one of the six 
banks the firm is related to has a low capital base. Correspondingly, firms which are not 
related to any low capitalized bank are defined as ʻHigh’. The results in Panel A of Table G3, 
Appendix G look quite similar to the results in Table 3. Second we define firms as ʻLow’ if all 
banks the firm is related to have a low capital endowment. These firms are likely to have no 
way of substituting external financing. Firms are defined as ʻHigh’ if at least one bank is non-
low capitalized. The results in Appendix G, Table G3, Panel B again look fairly similar to 
those in Table 3. 
5.5 Sample size and time period definition 
We perform various tests which concern the definition of the crisis and pre-crisis periods. 
Table H1 in Appendix H shows the corresponding results. First, we replace the crisis dummy 
(years 2007 to 2009) by a Basel dummy (2007) and Crisis dummy (2008 and 2009). The 
results are shown in Table H1, Panel A and are similar to the baseline results. Next, we 
account for the early 2000s recession – a period for Germany that was characterized by 
decreasing GDP growth and a recession in 2003 (Dustmann et al. 2014). Thus, we include a 
dummy for this pre-crisis downturn. As the first year in our sample is 2002, the dummy takes 
unit value in the years 2002 and 2003. As the downturn was probably unrelated to financial 
market issues26, no effect is found for the interaction with the Rating variable (Table H1, 
Panel B). In additional tests, which are shown in Table H2 of Appendix H, we deleted the 
26 See e.g. Cingano et al. (2016) who uses the early 2000s period as a placebo period for a shock to financial 
markets. 
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years 2002 and 2003 (Panel A) and 2002 to 2004 (Panel B). This does not affect our results 
either. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The impact of credit constraints for firms on R&D has been investigated for some time now 
(e.g. Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2010; Hall et al. 2016; He and Tian 2018). We extend this 
topic by taking two kinds of differentiation into account: the role of economic conditions in 
general and the impact of constraints of banks themselves. Economic conditions are 
considered by comparing the time of the financial crisis, as then demand and supply of debt 
was drastically affected, with periods before and afterwards. The impact of constraints of 
banks is included by taking up their bank balance sheet strength in terms of bank capital. 
Our results clearly indicate that financial constraints matter for R&D in general and become 
more relevant during the financial crisis.27 Firms with financing constraints reduce their R&D 
spending to a larger extent than less constrained firms during the crisis period, compared to 
the period before. With respect to the most important supplier of debts, namely the banks, it 
becomes obvious that banks with weaker balance sheets transmit their problems to their 
corporate customers. Thus, firms related to a bank with a weak capital endowment reduce 
their R&D spending in the financial crisis in accordance with their financing constraints. This 
effect is not observed for firms related to a high-capitalized bank. The consideration of bank 
constraints indicates that the financial crisis, rather than the Basel II enactment, was 
responsible for the sharper reduction in R&D expenditures. Thus, our results clearly imply an 
impact of bank financing on R&D. 
The results point to a need for more research on the risk attitudes of banks. Thus, in line with 
the recent development of capital buffers due to the Basel II and III guidelines, the importance 
of considering bank capital is underlined by our results. Consequently, an implication for 
policy makers which might be drawn from our results is that strengthening the bank balance 
sheet is an important device to achieve stability in times of turbulence on financial markets. 
As holding capital is costly, it might be difficult to find a balance between costs of capital in 
normal times and the benefits in times of downturn (Adrian et al. 2018; Thakor 2014). 
27 Our results coincide with findings of other work utilizing periods which do not include the financial crisis 
(e.g. Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2010; Hall et al. 2016; He and Tian 2018). Moreover, our findings are related to 
literature which investigates the impact of the crisis on innovation utilizing German data (e.g. Hud and 
Hussinger 2015; Kulicke et al. 2010; Rammer 2011). 
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We can also draw from our analysis several policy implications at the firm level. The 
cumulative public and private expenditures for R&D are below the EU policy target level of 
3% of GDP (OECD 2018). The European Commission (2010a) and European Commission 
(2010b) point to the importance of access to finance in order to realize innovation activities 
and, to this end, two additional sources of external finance must be considered: subsidies and 
venture capital. Firstly, as highlighted by the literature on R&D subsidies, due to their 
influence on the growth of an economy it is essential to provide financial support to 
innovative firms (e.g. Brautzsch et al. 2015; Hud and Hussinger 2015).28 Secondly, it might 
be important to support firms especially during times of difficult financing conditions, when 
banks are particularly cautious and will minimize their risks by reducing lending to innovative 
firms. In such periods public subsidies are especially valuable. Thirdly, another implication is 
the strengthening of venture capital financing. Even if this type of financing might be the least 
preferred by established firms, it is a valuable source of funding for younger firms (Brown et 
al. 2012; Hochberg et al. 2018). However, in Germany, the opportunities for venture capital 
financing are sparse. Fourthly, another option would be that firms make use of equity issuance 
to finance innovation (Brown et al. 2009; Lerner et al. 2011). However, like bank financing, 
equity financing contracted during the crisis (Kahle and Stulz 2013). 
 
 
  
28 See e.g. Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014) for an evaluation of the effectivity of a targeted subsidy program. 
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Appendix 
 
A Descriptive statistics 
 
Figure A1: Distribution of the tangible common equity ratio 
 
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the tangible common equity ratio over 1452 banks (left) from the 
Bankscope data set. The right diagram shows the distribution for the bottom 99% of the banks. 
 
 
Figure A2: Distribution of the capital funds ratio 
 
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the capital funds ratio over 1452 banks (left) from the Bankscope 
data set. The right diagram shows the distribution for the bottom 99% of the banks. 
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Table A1: Distribution of firms over industries 
Name NACE Rev. 2.0 code Firms Percentage share 
Mining 5-9, 19, 35 96 2.952 
Food/Tobacco 10-12 120 3.690 
Textiles 13-15 132 4.059 
Wood/Paper 16-17 110 3.383 
Chemicals 20-21 218 6.704 
Plastics 22 157 4.828 
Glass/Ceramics 23 93 2.860 
Metals 24-25 296 9.102 
Electrical equipment 26-27 489 15.037 
Machinery 28 374 11.501 
Retail/Automobile 29-30 129 3.967 
Furniture/Toys/Medical technology/Maintenance 31-33 235 7.226 
Energy / Water 36-39 66 2.030 
Media services 18, 58-60 98 3.014 
IT/Telecommunications 61-63 256 7.872 
Technical services/R&D services 71-72 288 8.856 
Consulting/advertising 69, 70.2, 73 95 2.921 
Total  3252 100.000 
 
 
Table A2: Distribution of firms over federal states 
Name Firms Percentage share 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 496 15.252 
Bavaria 457 14.053 
Berlin 122 3.752 
Brandenburg 120 3.690 
Bremen 53 1.630 
Hamburg 57 1.753 
Hesse 195 5.996 
Lower Saxony 230 7.073 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 58 1.784 
North Rhine-Westphalia 558 17.159 
Rhineland-Palatinate 109 3.352 
Saarland 31 0.953 
Saxony 355 10.916 
Saxony-Anhalt 145 4.459 
Schleswig-Holstein 62 1.907 
Thuringia 204 6.273 
Total 3252 100.000 
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B Additional results and marginal effects for the baseline estimation 
 
Table B1: Common trend test and effect heterogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rating -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.013** -0.011*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
Rating × 2003 -0.003  -0.002  
 (0.008)  (0.007)  
Rating × 2004 0.012  0.009  
 (0.007)  (0.007)  
Rating × 2005 -0.002  -0.004  
 (0.008)  (0.007)  
Rating × 2006 0.002  0.002  
 (0.007)  (0.007)  
Rating × 2007 -0.014* -0.017*** -0.015** -0.017*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Rating × 2008 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Rating × 2009 -0.020** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.024*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Rating × 2010 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
Rating × 2011 -0.009 -0.011 -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Rating × 2012 0.002 -0.000 0.004 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Constant 10.195*** 9.596*** 7.096*** 6.736*** 
 (1.815) (1.449) (1.718) (1.397) 
𝐻𝐻0: Rating × yeart = 0 ∀ t < 2007  
p-value 0.107  0.194  
𝐻𝐻0: Rating × yeart = 0 ∀ t ≤ 2012  
p-value 0.006  0.003  
Firm controls - - Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Federal state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -24177.002 -24179.376 -23880.642 -23882.502 
Left censored obs. 2159 2159 2159 2159 
Uncensored obs. 6580 6580 6580 6580 
Obs. 8739 8739 8739 8739 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. Significance: * significant at the 
10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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C Detailed and additional results for the estimations with bank splits 
Table C1: Estimation results with all variables included based on tangible common 
equity splitting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Low High 
Rating -0.016***  -0.011*** -0.018***  -0.014** 
 (0.003)  (0.004) (0.006)  (0.007) 
Rating × Pre-Crisis  -0.011***   -0.014**  
  (0.004)   (0.007)  
Rating × Crisis  -0.026*** -0.015***  -0.022*** -0.008 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Rating × PostCrisis  -0.014*** -0.004  -0.022** -0.008 
  (0.004) (0.005)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Size 0.849*** 0.837*** 0.837*** 1.202*** 1.194*** 1.194*** 
 (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.351) (0.362) (0.362) 
Size squared -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Age -0.024 -0.024* -0.024* -0.052** -0.053** -0.053** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Age squared 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Group 0.740*** 0.751*** 0.751*** 1.080** 1.079** 1.079** 
 (0.280) (0.280) (0.280) (0.474) (0.473) (0.473) 
Sales growth 0.319 0.317 0.317 0.635 0.675 0.675 
 (0.295) (0.295) (0.295) (0.682) (0.680) (0.680) 
Export share 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 7.796*** 6.769*** 6.769*** 7.648*** 6.773*** 6.773*** 
 (1.731) (1.790) (1.790) (2.350) (2.446) (2.446) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Federal state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -17487.261 -17481.776 -17481.776 -6332.266 -6331.509 -6331.509 
Left censored obs. 1466 1466 1466 693 693 693 
Uncensored obs. 4889 4889 4889 1691 1691 1691 
Obs. 6355 6355 6355 2384 2384 2384 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. Low indicates that the firm is 
related to a bank in the lower 25% of the variable’s distribution of all German banks in the Bankscope data set. 
Significance: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table C2: Estimation results with all variables included based on capital funds splitting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Low High 
Rating -0.017***  -0.012*** -0.014***  -0.010* 
 (0.003)  (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005) 
Rating × Pre-Crisis  -0.012***   -0.010*  
  (0.004)   (0.005)  
Rating × Crisis  -0.028*** -0.017***  -0.015** -0.005 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Rating × PostCrisis  -0.014*** -0.002  -0.018*** -0.008 
  (0.004) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Size 0.766*** 0.757*** 0.757*** 1.409*** 1.406*** 1.406*** 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.324) (0.329) (0.329) 
Size squared -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Group 0.909*** 0.925*** 0.925*** 0.694* 0.702* 0.702* 
 (0.315) (0.315) (0.315) (0.363) (0.362) (0.362) 
Sales growth 0.156 0.164 0.164 0.740 0.755* 0.755* 
 (0.332) (0.332) (0.332) (0.456) (0.455) (0.455) 
Export share 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 7.813*** 6.856*** 6.856*** 6.904*** 6.123*** 6.123*** 
 (1.766) (1.843) (1.843) (2.126) (2.181) (2.181) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Federal state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -17487.261 -17481.776 -17481.776 -6332.266 -6331.509 -6331.509 
Left censored obs. 1166 1166 1166 993 993 993 
Uncensored obs. 4049 4049 4049 2531 2531 2531 
Obs. 5215 5215 5215 3524 3524 3524 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. Low indicates that the firm is 
related to a bank in the lower 25% of the variable’s distribution of all German banks in the Bankscope data set. 
Significance: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table C3: Common trend test and effect heterogeneity 
 Tangible common equity Capital funds 
 Low High Low High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rating -0.011* -0.020 -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) 
Rating × 2003 -0.002 0.004 -0.007 0.011 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.010) (0.012) 
Rating × 2004 0.008 0.015 0.005 0.013 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) 
Rating × 2005 -0.006 0.002 -0.004 -0.008 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.009) (0.012) 
Rating × 2006 -0.000 0.005 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) 
Rating × 2007 -0.019** -0.010 -0.016* -0.017 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.013) 
Rating × 2008 -0.008 0.012 -0.013 0.016 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.010) (0.013) 
Rating × 2009 -0.022** -0.027 -0.024** -0.019 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.010) (0.014) 
Rating × 2010 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.009) (0.012) 
Rating × 2011 -0.006 -0.011 0.001 -0.023 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.015) 
Rating × 2012 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.006 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.013) 
Constant 6.900*** 8.173** 6.884*** 6.690** 
 (2.056) (3.357) (2.229) (2.899) 
𝐻𝐻0: Rating × yeart = 0 ∀ t < 2007  
p-value 0.382 0.633 0.541 0.228 
𝐻𝐻0: Rating × yeart = 0 ∀ t ≤ 2012 
p-value 0.026 0.425 0.050 0.048 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Federal state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -17478.411 -6327.529 -14401.005 -9385.943 
Left censored obs. 1466 693 1166 993 
Uncensored obs. 4889 1691 4049 2531 
Obs. 6355 2384 5215 3524 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. Low indicates that the firm is 
related to a bank in the lower 25% of the variable’s distribution of all German banks in the Bankscope data set.  
Significance: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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D Endogenous firm-bank matching and sample selection 
 
Table D1: Matching results to obtain the propensity score for the construction of the inverse 
probability weights 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable        Low Tangible Common Equity Low Capital Funds 
Rating −0.003** −0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Rating × 2003 0.000 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Rating × 2004 0.002 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Rating × 2005 0.000 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Rating × 2006 0.001 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Rating × 2007 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Rating × 2008 0.000 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Rating × 2009 0.002 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Rating × 2010 0.001 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Rating × 2011 0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Rating × 2012 0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Size 0.108*** 0.106*** 
 (0.033) (0.027) 
Size squared −0.002*** −0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 0.002 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Group membership 0.417*** 0.396*** 
 (0.035) (0.032) 
Sales growth −0.008 −0.081 
 (0.064) (0.060) 
Export share 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.501 0.952*** 
 (0.337) (0.324) 
Log likelihood -4197.067 -5125.850 
Observations 8739 8739 
Notes: Treatment status is defined as being related to a low capitalized bank. Each regression 
includes industry times federal state fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: * 
significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table D2: Mean comparison after matching – Means calculated using inverse probability 
weights 
 
 Mean Difference p-value 
Variable Control Treated   
Panel A: Tangible Common Equity 
Rating 217.559 216.401 −1.157 0.505 
Rating × 2003 9.253 10.954 1.701 0.199 
Rating × 2004 19.229 20.683 1.454 0.542 
Rating × 2005 18.494 18.487 −0.007 0.998 
Rating × 2006 24.281 23.999 −0.282 0.918 
Rating × 2007 18.882 21.027 2.145 0.281 
Rating × 2008 24.863 25.850 0.986 0.675 
Rating × 2009 12.759 14.504 1.745 0.285 
Rating × 2010 37.092 27.729 −9.363 0.120 
Rating × 2011 15.625 16.303 0.678 0.722 
Rating × 2012 20.532 21.404 0.872 0.704 
Size 0.470 0.342 −0.128 0.493 
Size Squared 7.408 4.284 −3.125 0.615 
Age 30.359 31.011 0.652 0.546 
Age squared 1878.887 1959.242 80.355 0.519 
Group membership 0.498 0.492 −0.007 0.777 
Sales growth 0.060 0.063 0.004 0.829 
Export share 24.057 24.016 −0.041 0.970 
Panel B: Capital Funds 
Rating 216.636 217.214 0.577 0.641 
Rating × 2003 11.388 11.118 −0.270 0.865 
Rating × 2004 21.206 20.763 −0.443 0.813 
Rating × 2005 18.200 18.445 0.245 0.876 
Rating × 2006 23.132 23.863 0.732 0.690 
Rating × 2007 19.612 20.879 1.267 0.410 
Rating × 2008 24.670 25.864 1.194 0.495 
Rating × 2009 13.432 14.364 0.932 0.474 
Rating × 2010 28.383 27.946 −0.437 0.830 
Rating × 2011 16.372 16.549 0.177 0.909 
Rating × 2012 22.763 21.866 −0.897 0.718 
Size 0.484 0.347 −0.137 0.258 
Size squared 7.796 4.445 −3.350 0.368 
Age 30.643 30.741 0.099 0.904 
Age squared 1926.061 1945.922 19.861 0.855 
Group membership 0.506 0.491 −0.015 0.285 
Sales growth 0.073 0.065 −0.008 0.330 
Export share 24.150 24.027 −0.124 0.870 
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Table D3: Weighted estimations for the impact of firm financing constraints on R&D 
accounting for bank differences 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Baseline Tangible common equity 
  Low High 
Panel A: Tangible Common Equity 
Rating −0.016*** −0.012*** −0.025*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Rating × Crisis −0.013** −0.012** −0.014 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.008 −0.002 −0.008 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) 
Constant 8.067*** 6.494*** 9.305*** 
 (1.412) (1.916) (2.115) 
Observations 8613 6229 2384 
Panel B: Capital Funds 
 Baseline Capital Funds 
  Low High 
Rating −0.014*** −0.013*** −0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Rating × Crisis −0.012** −0.014** −0.007 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.002 0.002 −0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Constant 8.143*** 6.796*** 9.338*** 
 (1.344) (1.919) (1.852) 
Observations 8693 5169 3524 
Notes: All estimations include firm controls as described in Section 3.1. Moreover, 
industry, federal state and time fixed effects are included. Baseline refers to the 
estimation of Equation (1) with the changes highlighted in the respective heading of 
each panel. Low indicates that the firm is related to a bank in the lower 25% of the 
variable’s distribution of all German banks in the Bankscope data set. Cluster-robust 
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. Significance: * significant at 
the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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E Model and dependent variable 
 
Table E1: Model and dependent variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline Tangible common equity Capital Funds 
  Low High Low High 
Panel A: Homoscedastic Tobit 
Rating -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012* -0.012** -0.012* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Rating × Crisis -0.012*** -0.013** -0.011 -0.015*** -0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
Rating × PostCrisis 0.000 0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant 7.612*** 8.114*** 6.727*** 7.455*** 6.837*** 
 (1.187) (1.453) (2.190) (1.504) (1.909) 
Observations 8739 6355 2384 5215 3254 
Panel B: OLS 
Rating −0.012*** −0.011*** −0.011** −0.011*** −0.010** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Rating × Crisis −0.008** −0.009** −0.007 −0.011** −0.005 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Rating × PostCrisis 0.000 0.001 −0.005 −0.001 −0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 8.888*** 9.240*** 8.305*** 8.737*** 8.321*** 
 (0.891) (1.112) (1.581) (1.169) (1.360) 
Observations 8739 6355 2384 5215 3254 
Panel C: Heteroscedastic Tobit with scaled dependent variable 
Rating −0.003 −0.002 −0.006 −0.002 −0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Rating × Crisis −0.009*** −0.011*** −0.007 −0.011*** −0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Constant 4.005*** 4.009*** 4.557*** 3.967*** 4.052*** 
 (0.882) (1.149) (1.482) (1.171) (1.370) 
Observations 8713 6334 2379 5199 3514 
Notes: All estimations include firm controls as described in Section 3.1. Moreover, industry, federal 
state and time fixed effects are included. Baseline refers to the estimation of Equation (1) with the 
changes highlighted in the respective heading of each panel. Low indicates that the firm is related to a 
bank in the lower 25% of the variable’s distribution of all German banks in the Bankscope data set. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. Significance: * significant at 
the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table E2: Changes to the heteroscedasticity term 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline Tangible common equity Capital funds 
 Low High Low High 
Panel A: Baseline – Three size dummies, two age dummies, industry dummies 
Rating −0.011*** −0.011*** −0.014** −0.012*** −0.010* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Rating × Crisis −0.013*** −0.015*** −0.008 −0.017*** −0.005 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.004 −0.004 −0.008 −0.002 −0.008 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) 
Constant 6.743*** 6.769*** 6.773*** 6.856*** 6.123*** 
 (1.398) (1.790) (2.446) (1.843) (2.181) 
Observations 8739 6355 2384 5215 3254 
Panel B: Three size dummies, two age dummies 
Rating −0.013*** −0.012*** −0.013* −0.011** −0.011* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Rating × Crisis −0.011** −0.012** −0.012 −0.014** −0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.001 0.000 −0.008 −0.002 −0.005 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant 7.546*** 8.177*** 6.872*** 7.501*** 6.597*** 
 (1.183) (1.453) (2.183) (1.511) (1.916) 
Observations 8739 6355 2384 5215 3254 
Panel C: Only industry dummies 
Rating −0.012*** −0.011*** −0.013* −0.012*** −0.010* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Rating × Crisis −0.012*** −0.016*** −0.007 −0.017*** −0.006 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.003 −0.003 −0.007 −0.002 −0.007 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) 
Constant 6.865*** 6.763*** 6.742*** 6.870*** 6.185*** 
 (1.397) (1.784) (2.492) (1.821) (2.189) 
Observations 8739 6355 2384 5215 3254 
Panel D: Baseline variables and Group, Sales growth, Export share 
Rating −0.011*** −0.011*** −0.013** −0.012*** −0.009* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Rating × Crisis −0.012*** −0.013*** −0.010 −0.016*** −0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.004 −0.005 −0.006 −0.003 −0.007 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) 
Constant 6.735*** 6.599*** 6.818*** 6.796*** 5.977*** 
 (1.371) (1.813) (2.354) (1.872) (2.058) 
Observations 8739 6355 2384 5215 3254 
Notes: All estimations include firm controls as described in Section 3.1. Moreover, industry, federal 
state and time fixed effects are included. Baseline refers to the estimation of Equation (1) with the 
changes highlighted in the respective heading of each panel. Low indicates that the firm is related to a 
bank in the lower 25% of the variable’s distribution of all German banks in the Bankscope data set. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. Significance: * significant at 
the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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F Changes to the rating variable 
 
Table F1: Changes of the rating variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline Tangible common equity Capital funds 
 Low High Low High 
Panel A: Lagged rating index 
Rating −0.011*** −0.010*** −0.013** −0.012*** −0.008 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Rating × Crisis −0.010** −0.012** −0.005 −0.014*** −0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.004 −0.003 −0.010 −0.001 −0.010 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) 
Constant 6.629*** 6.659*** 6.677*** 6.905*** 5.581*** 
 (1.367) (1.773) (2.359) (1.808) (2.144) 
Observations 8739 6355 2384 5215 3254 
Panel B: Mean of rating over the period 2004 to 2006 
Rating −0.013*** −0.011** −0.022*** −0.012** −0.014** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Rating × Crisis −0.017*** −0.018*** −0.014 −0.016*** −0.017** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.005 −0.007 −0.001 −0.004 −0.009 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) 
Constant 7.371*** 7.195*** 8.683*** 7.104*** 7.201*** 
 (1.496) (1.873) (2.742) (1.968) (2.328) 
Observations 7564 5540 2024 4598 2966 
Panel C: Adding observations with ratings equal or above 500 
Rating −0.007*** −0.005** −0.015** −0.005* −0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
Rating × Crisis −0.011** −0.012** −0.009 −0.013** −0.005 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.005 −0.007* 0.002 −0.008* 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) 
Constant 5.741*** 5.660*** 6.962*** 5.444*** 6.510*** 
 (1.293) (1.661) (2.422) (1.690) (2.053) 
Observations 8806 6405 2401 5263 3543 
Notes: All estimations include firm controls as described in Section 3.1. Moreover, industry, federal 
state and time fixed effects are included. Baseline refers to the estimation of Equation (1) with the 
changes highlighted in the respective heading of each panel. Low indicates that the firm is related to a 
bank in the lower 25% of the variable’s distribution of all German banks in the Bankscope data set. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. Significance: * significant at 
the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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G Changes concerning bank-related information 
 
Table G1: Changes concerning bank-related information 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline Tangible common equity Capital funds 
 Low High Low High 
Panel A: Cut point for bank variables at 10% 
Rating −0.011*** −0.008** −0.013** −0.011* −0.011** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Rating × Crisis −0.013*** −0.015*** −0.009 −0.017** −0.011** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.004 −0.005 −0.010 −0.005 −0.007 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) 
Constant 6.743*** 6.689*** 6.279*** 7.411*** 5.839*** 
 (1.398) (1.877) (2.310) (2.624) (1.613) 
Observations 8739 5432 3307 2409 6330 
Panel B: Cut point for bank variables at 50% 
Rating −0.011*** −0.011*** −0.016* −0.013*** −0.007 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) 
Rating × Crisis −0.013*** −0.015*** −0.001 −0.015*** −0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.004 −0.005 −0.007 −0.003 −0.006 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.009) 
Constant 6.743*** 6.253*** 9.206*** 7.059*** 4.768* 
 (1.398) (1.596) (3.137) (1.587) (2.697) 
Observations 8739 7615 1124 6339 2400 
Panel C: Without bank switching firms 
Rating −0.012*** −0.011** −0.016 −0.015*** −0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.008) 
Rating × Crisis −0.014** −0.019*** 0.006 −0.019*** −0.006 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.005 −0.004 −0.005 0.001 −0.011 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.010) 
Constant 7.443*** 8.316*** 5.900* 9.425*** 3.678 
 (1.687) (2.020) (3.421) (2.006) (2.946) 
Observations 5765 4212 1553 3468 2297 
Notes: All estimations include firm controls as described in Section 3.1. Moreover, industry, federal 
state and time fixed effects are included. Baseline refers to the estimation of Equation (1) with the 
changes highlighted in the respective heading of each panel. Low indicates that the firm is related to a 
bank in the lower 10% (Panel A), 25% (Panel C) or 50% (Panel B) of the variable’s distribution of all 
German banks in the Bankscope data set. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 
firm level. Significance: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at 
the 1% level. 
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Table G2: Results based on different variables for bank capitalization 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline Equity over total assets Capital funds over net loans 
 Low High Low High 
Rating −0.011*** −0.011*** −0.014** -0.007 −0.012***  
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
Rating × Crisis −0.013** −0.016*** −0.007 −0.023*** −0.008 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.004 −0.004 −0.008 −0.006 −0.007 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) 
Constant 6.743*** 6.698*** 6.807*** 6.728*** 6.210*** 
 (1.398) (1.772) (2.472) (2.048) (1.783) 
Observations 8739 6371 2368 3130 5609 
Notes: All estimations include firm controls as described in Section 3.1. Moreover, industry, federal state and 
time fixed effects are included. Baseline refers to the estimation of Equation (1) with the changes highlighted in 
the respective heading of each panel. Low indicates that the firm is related to a bank in the lower 25% of the 
variable’s distribution of all German banks in the Bankscope data set. Cluster-robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered at the firm level. Significance: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% 
level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table G3: Using the full set of bank information 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline Tangible common equity Capital funds 
 Low High Low High 
Panel A: Low: at least one bank low capitalized; High: no bank low capitalized 
Rating −0.011*** −0.012*** 0.012 −0.013*** 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) 
Rating × Crisis −0.013*** −0.013*** −0.017 −0.012** −0.016 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.010) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.004 −0.003 −0.026 −0.001 −0.024** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.011) 
Constant 6.743*** 7.567*** −1.845 7.199*** 2.927 
 (1.398) (1.491) (4.266) (1.589) (3.012) 
Observations 8739 7734 1005 6883 1856 
Panel B: Low: all banks low capitalized; High: at least one bank high capitalized 
Rating −0.011*** −0.006 −0.023*** −0.016** −0.011** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) 
Rating × Crisis −0.013*** −0.019*** −0.003 −0.015* −0.013** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.004 −0.005 −0.002 0.014 −0.008 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) 
Constant 6.743*** 5.958*** 10.136*** 7.816*** 6.485*** 
 (1.398) (1.989) (2.308) (2.532) (2.068) 
Observations 8739 4992 2742 2876 4007 
Notes: All estimations include firm controls as described in Section 3.1. Moreover, industry, federal state 
and time fixed effects are included. Baseline refers to the estimation of Equation (1) with the changes 
highlighted in the respective heading of each panel. Low indicates that the firm is related to a bank in the 
lower 25% of the variable’s distribution of all German banks in the Bankscope data set. Cluster-robust 
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. Significance: * significant at the 10% level, ** 
significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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H Sample size and time period definition 
 
Table H1: Changes to time period definition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline Tangible common equity Capital funds 
 Low High Low High 
Panel A: Differentiate Basel introduction and Crisis period 
Rating −0.011*** −0.011*** −0.014** −0.012*** −0.010* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Rating × Basel −0.017*** −0.020*** −0.016 −0.016** −0.020** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) 
Rating × Crisis −0.011** −0.013** −0.004 −0.017*** 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) 
Rating × PostCrisis        −0.004       −0.004    −0.008    −0.002    −0.008 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) 
Constant 6.745*** 6.772*** 6.788*** 6.855*** 6.136*** 
 (1.396) (1.788) (2.447) (1.843) (2.181) 
Observations 8739 6355 2384 5215 3254 
Panel B: With pre-crisis downturn (2002 and 2003) 
Rating −0.010*** −0.010** −0.012* −0.010** −0.011* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Rating × Early2000 −0.004 −0.002 −0.005 −0.004 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) 
Rating × Crisis −0.014*** −0.016*** −0.010 −0.018*** −0.004 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.005 −0.004 −0.010 −0.003 −0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant 7.288*** 7.048*** 7.662** 7.502*** 5.602** 
 (1.579) (1.927) (3.037) (2.054) (2.555) 
Observations 8739 6355 2384 5215 3254 
Notes: All estimations include firm controls as described in Section 3.1. Moreover, industry, federal 
state and time fixed effects are included. Baseline refers to the estimation of Equation (1) with the 
changes highlighted in the respective heading of each panel. Low indicates that the firm is related to a 
bank in the lower 25% of the variable’s distribution of all German banks in the Bankscope data set. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. Significance: ∗ significant at 
the 10% level, ∗∗ significant at the 5% level, ∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level. 
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Table H2: Changes to sample size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline Tangible common equity Capital funds 
 Low High Low High 
Panel A: Without the years 2002 and 2003 
Rating −0.010*** −0.009** −0.013* −0.010** −0.011* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Rating × Crisis −0.014*** −0.016*** −0.010 −0.017*** −0.005 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.005 −0.004 −0.008 −0.003 −0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant 7.103*** 7.224*** 7.432*** 6.792*** 7.500*** 
 (1.473) (1.901) (2.535) (1.996) (2.233) 
Observations 7617 5504 2113 4483 3134 
Panel B: Without the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 
Rating −0.014*** −0.013** −0.019** −0.012** −0.018*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Rating × Crisis −0.011** −0.012** −0.006 −0.016** 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) 
Rating × PostCrisis −0.002 −0.001 −0.004 −0.001 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) 
Constant 7.818*** 7.891*** 8.681*** 7.102*** 8.779*** 
 (1.691) (2.209) (2.696) (2.332) (2.361) 
Observations 6770 4876 1894 3960 2810 
Notes: All estimations include firm controls as described in Section 3.1. Moreover, industry, federal 
state and time fixed effects are included. Baseline refers to the estimation of Equation (1) with the 
changes highlighted in the respective heading of each panel. Low indicates that the firm is related to a 
bank in the lower 25% of the variable’s distribution of all German banks in the Bankscope data set. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. Significance: * significant at 
the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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